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Forbes: Gifts to Minors

Gifts to Minors'
By BEN N. FORBES*
GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES
Everyone wants to reduce his tax liability. An easy way to do so is
simply to give property away. It's very easy to find plenty of takers. It
becomes more difficult, however, to give it away, but keep it in the family
at the same time. However, Congress and many states, including Montana,
are making it easier to do just that.
Probably the easiest way to make a gift, whether to a minor or anyone
else, is simply to give the property outright to the donee. Such a method
of making a gift to a minor is also as advantageous from a gift tax standpoint as any other method. In Revenue Ruling 54-400,' the government
ruled that an outright gift to a minor, whether it is with or without the
appointment of a guardian, is not a future interest and is therefore qualified for the $3,000 annual exclusion, taking the position that the disabilities against minors under various state laws should not be conclusive regarding federal tax consequences.
If cash or a check is given to the minor, there is no gift tax problem
and the donor will be allowed the annual exclusion. If a gift is made to a
minor of an insurance policy, it is quite clear that the donor will receive
the full $3,000 exclusion allowed by law. Although the proceeds from such
a policy may not be paid over to the minor for a long period of time, it
still is not deemed a future interest. Regulation 25.2503-3' states that the
term "future interest" does not have reference to such contractual rights
as exist in bonds, notes or life insurance policies wherein the money may
not actually be paid to the owner until some future time.
As a general rule, however, donors do not like to make outright gifts
to minors. The main reason for this attitude is their reluctance to turn
over control of any substantial amount of money or property to a minor
who very probably is not yet mature enough to handle it wisely. In addition, if one wishes to make a gift of corporate securities or government
bonds, an outright gift presents an immediate and practical problem. If
no guardianship is established, then it is almost impossible to sell such
securities. Almost all stockbrokers and others dealing in such securities
will not buy them from a minor, or even act as the minor's agent to make
a sale, since the minor can disaffirm the sale in the event it turns out to be
disadvantageous. Even if a guardian for the minor is appointed, the
problem is not solved. In Montana, as in most other states, a guardian of
tThis article was originally delivered orally at the Fifth Annual Tax School presented by the School of Law at Montana State University in December, 1957.
*Law firm of Brown, Sande, Symmes and Forbes, Billings, Montana. Member of the
Montana Bar. B.S., Colorado University, 1948; LL.B., Montana State University,
1951; LL.M. (Taxation), New York University, 1957.
'1954-2 CuM. BuLL. 319.
'Proposed Reg. See. 25.2503-3(a) (1957).
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a minor is required to post a bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duties,' which sometimes means that the surety on the bond desires some control over the assets. An accounting must be made regularly
to the court' and, more troublesome yet, the kind of investments that a
guardian may make is very limited.' Generally speaking, the inconvenience and restrictions of a guardianship preclude the use of this device in
an estate plan.
Because of the undesirable aspects of outright gifts to minors, many
donors have attempted to make restrictive gifts to their children. In the
gift tax field the main problem regarding a restrictive gift to a minor is
found in the Internal Revenue Code, section 2503(b). This section denies
the $3,000 annual exclusion (or $6,000 if husband and wife join in the
gift') if the gift made is one of a.future interest. A future interest is defined in the regulations and court decisions as an interest in which the
donee does not have the right to the present use, possession and enjoyment
of the property.' In order to appreciate some of the problems created by
this limitation, a brief examination of some of the relevant cases dealing
with this provision will be made. In Stifel v. Commissioner,' the donor set
up three trusts, one for each of his children, that were irrevocable. Each
trust was for the life of the child beneficiary and gave to the trustee the
power to invade the corpus of the trust or to accumulate the income from
the trust in the trustee's discretion. The trusts also provided that a child,
through a guardian, could demand all of the income at any time, and the
child could likewise at any time terminate the trust and thereby obtain all
of the accumulated income and corpus. The Second Circuit held that this
was a gift of a future interest to the child even though the child had the
right at any time to terminate the trust and thereby obtain all of the corpus
and accumulated income. The reasoning of the court was that since there
was no actual guardian appointed for the child, and since a guardian would
of necessity have to be appointed in order for the child to demand and receive all of the income and corpus from the trust, the child did not really
have the present use, possession and enjoyment of the property. Therefore, the $3,000 annual exclusion was not allowed. Though the disallowance of this exclusion may not in many instances cause very much tax
liability, in other situations the amount involved can be quite large. For
example, in the Stifel case it apparently was the intention of the donor to
make gifts to each of the trusts each year to the maximum of the annual
exclusion. And since the annual exclusion can amount to the sum of $6,000
each year for as many different persons to whom the donor desires to make
gifts, the amount involved can be substantial. In the Stifel case, if the
donor and his wife joined together, they could make payments totaling
8
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4Ibid.

MONT. CONST. art. V, § 37: "No act of the legislative assembly shall authorize the
investment of trust funds by ... guardians ...in the bonds or stock of any private
corporation."
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2513.
'Proposed Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1957); Evans v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 435 (3d
Cir. 1952).
8197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952).
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$18,000 every year without any gift tax liability if their trusts had qualified for the annual exclusion.
In Kieckhofer v. Commissioner,' the Seventh Circuit, in dealing with a
trust substantially the same as those found in the Stifel case, held that the
mere fact that no guardian had been appointed for the minor donee did
not disqualify the trusts so as to disallow the annual exclusion. The Kieckhofer case is directly contrary to the Stifel case.
The Kieckhofer approach is to look solely at the trust instrument, and
if the right to present enjoyment is found in the instrument, the inquiry
ends and a present interest will be deemed to have been given. Under the
Stifel approach, the finding of a right to present enjoyment in the trust
instrument is only the first step toward finding a present interest, for inquiry is then made into the "surrounding circumstances" at the time of
the creation of the trust to find someone-namely a guardian-who can
effectively exercise such a right. Another point made in a footnote by the
court in the Stifel case, however, is very significant. Assuming there is a
guardian, it is indicated that he must not be under the control of the donor.
Such a view is grounded on the basic policy against allowing the donor to
escape taxes'by effecting illusory transfers. But avoiding this policy will
seriously curtail the desirability of granting the benficiary the power of
termination. That is, by placing such a power in the hands of an independent guardian, so as to comply with the Stifel case, will often disturb family purposes by placing the ultimate control of funds in the hands of a
stranger. Moreover, should the power be exercised by such a third party,
the advantages of a trust form over a guardianship are lost.
In two other cases the basic problem presented in the Stifel and Kieckhofer decisions was solved in another way. In Strekalovsky v. Delaney"
and Cannon v. Robertson, both federal district court cases, the trust instruments directed the trustees to apply or pay over the principal as if
they were guardians for the minor beneficiaries. In these cases the courts
reasoned that a gift outright in guardianship would be a present interest
and that the relation between the trustee and the minor beneficiary created
by the guardianship language found in the trust instruments was so closely
analogous to outright guardianships that the interests created should be
considered a present interest rather than a future interest. However, the
use of this device is not very practical, since it merely creates in a different form some of the same problems that are inherent in any guardianship;
e.g., the trustee's power to pay income to the minor may be restricted by
the necessity of showing need as per the general guardianship rule.
Many donors have established trusts in which the donors themselves
or some friendly third party are named as trustee, in which the right was
reserved to accumulate or pay out so much of the income as the trustee in
his discretion deemed proper, and further provided that the corpus must
be distributed to the minor beneficiary at some age subsequent to the age of
twenty-one. In Rassas v. Commissioner," the Seventh Circuit, which decided the Kieckhofer case, made it clear that such a trust would not come
'189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1952).
1078 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass. 1948).
"9 F. Supp. 331 (W.D.N.C. 1951).
2196 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1952).
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within the Kieckhofer rule, and the court therefore denied the applicability
of the annual exclusion. The court held that even though the right to the
income from the trust was vested in the minor, the minor did not have the
immediate right of use and possession and therefore the gift was of a future interest.
In order to give some relief in this field and to provide more certainty
in the law, Congress in 1954 enacted section 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. This section provides that a gift to a minor will qualify for the
annual exclusion, whether or not in trust, if (1) the property and the income may be expended for the minor before the minor reaches the age of
twenty-one; (2) to the extent not so expended, the income must pass to the
minor when he reaches the age of twenty-one; and (3) in the event the
minor dies before reaching the age of twenty-one, the corpus and accumulated income must be payable to the minor's estate or as the minor may
appoint under a general power of appdintment. For example, a father creates a trust with income to his son, who is four years of age, for seventeen
years. The corpus and the accumulated income are to be distributed to his
son at the age of twenty-one or to his estate if he dies sooner. The trustee
is given the discretionary power to accumulate the income and to invade
the corpus for the benefit of the son. Each year the father transfers $3,000
in cash to the trust. Under section 2503(c), these annual gifts would
qualify for the gift tax exclusion even though the son would not receive
any income during his minority if the trustee should choose to accumulate
it. The main problem of section 2503(c) is that many donors will hesitate
to fulfill the second statutory requirement; i.e., that the entire property
must be distributed to the donee upon his reaching the age of twenty-one,
especially where the gift is a large one or involves managerial duties. In
this event, the donor must therefore go back to the law as it existed prior
to the enactment of 2503(c), namely, attempt to come under the doctrine
of the Kieckhofer case, if that is the law in the district wherein the donor
resides.
In order to take full advantage of the change made by Congress
through section 2503(c), many states, including Montana,' have enacted
the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. As will be seen from the following explanation of the terms of this Act, it is designed to qualify under section
2503(c). The Uniform Act makes it possible for an adult to make a gift
to a minor of securities or money without the gift being outright, in guardianship or in trust. If the gift is a gift of a security in registered form,
the gift is made by registering the security in the name of the donor, an
adult member of the minor's family, a guardian of the minor, or a trust
company, followed by the words "as custodian for [name of minor] under
the Montana Uniform Gifts to Minors Act."" If the subject of the gift is
a security not in registered form, the gift can be made by delivering it to
?&R.C.M. 1947, §§ 67-1801 to 1811. The Uniform Act was promulgated in 1956 and
has already been adopted by 16 states. It is closely patterned on the Model Act
Concerning Gifts of Securities to Minors adopted by 12 other states plus the District of Columbia in 1955 and 1956. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act, 9B U.L.A. See also Montana Legislative Summarj, 1957, 18 MoNTANA

L. REv. 125, 134 (1957).

"'It may be well to note that the portion of the act, as adopted in Montana, which
specifies to whom the property is to be delivered, or in whose name it is to be reg-
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an adult person other than the donor, who must be either a member of the
minor's family or a guardian of the minor, or to a trust company, accompanied by a statement of gift. The form of this statement of gift is prescribed in the statute, and is substantially that the donor does thereby deliver to the custodian for a named minor, under the Montana Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act, certain described securities. A gift of money is made
by paying or delivering it to a broker or a bank for credit to an account in
the name of the donor, an adult member of the minor's family, a guardian
of the minor, or a bank with trust powers, and giving a statement following the payment or delivery "as custodian for [name of minor] under the
Montana Uniform Gifts to Minors Act."
If a gift is made in any of the ways set forth above, then under the terms
of the Act the gift is made irrevocable and conveys an indefeasibly vested
legal title to the securities or money given -to the minor, and, in making a
gift in the prescribed manner, the donor incorporates in his gift all of the
provisions of the Uniform Act, thereby granting to the custodian all of the
powers contained -therein.
A gift made under the terms of the Act gives to the custodian the
power to collect, hold, manage, invest and reinvest the custodial property.
In fact, the provisions regarding the powers of the custodian read like a
modern liberal discretionary trust instrument. It is provided that the
custodian
pay over to the minor for expediture by him, or expend for
the minor's benefit, so much of or all the custodial property as
the custodian deems advisable for the support, maintenance, edu-

istered, is ambiguous. An examination of subsection 1 of section 67-1802 will be
sufficient to point this out, as the other two subsections are similarly worded.
After the preliminary portion of section 67-1802, authorizing a gift by an adult
to a minor, subsection 1 reads as follows: "If the subject of the gift is a security
in registered form, by registering it in the name of the donor, another adult person
(an adult member of the minor's family, a; guardian of the minor) or a trust com-

pany." A possible construction of this passage is that if the gift is not registered
in the name of the donor o4 a trust company, it must be registered in the name of
an adult member of the minor's family who is also a guardian of the minor. Such
a construction would defeat a major purpose of the act, which is to avoid the necessity of appointment of a guardian when a gift is made to the minor. Therefore,
the proper construction would be that while the parenthetical phrase qualifies the
words "another adult person." it presents two alternatives rather than restricting

them to one class of persons.
The commissioners' note regarding this portion of the act provides that if the
words "an adult member of the minor's family, a guardian of the minor" are to
be used, the words "another adult person" immediately preceding should be omitted.
Furthermore, the act did not intend that the words be enclosed in parentheses at

all: the words were enclosed in brackets by the commissioners to Indicate that they
could be eliminated if the legislature wished to allow the gift to be
adult person." In other words, it was contemplated that either "any
or "an adult member of the minor's family, a guardian of the minor"
but they were not to be used at the same time. Commissioners' note,
to Minors Act, § 2, 9B U.L.A.
If the statute had been drafted in accordance with this apparent

made to "any
adult person,"
could be used,
Uniform Gifts
intent, subsec-

tion 1 would read as follows: "if the subject of the gift is a security in registered
form, by registering it in the name of the donor, an adult member of the minor's
family. a guardian of the minor, or a trust company." As pointed out above, subsections 2 and 3 of the statute. as it is presently drafted, contain the same am-

biguity.
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1957
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cation and benefit of the minor in the manner, at the time or
times, and to the extent that the custodian in his discretion deems
suitable and proper, with or without court order, with or without
regard to the duty of himself or of any other person to support
the minor or his ability to do so, and with or without regard to
any other income or property of the minor which may be applicable or available for any such purpose.'
The Act further provides that on the petition of a parent or guardian
of the minor, or of the minor himself if he has attained the age of fourteen
years, a court may order the custodian to pay over to the minor for expenditure by him, or to expend so much or all of the custodial property as
is necessary, for the minor's support, maintenance or education. To the
extent that the custodial property is not expended on behalf of the minor,
then the custodian is required to pay all of it over to the minor upon his
attaining the age of twenty-one years; if the minor dies before attaining
the age of twenty-one years, the custodian is required to deliver the property to the estate of the minor.
The custodian is given broad powers of investment and may invest in
any properties he desires without regard to statutes restricting investments
by fiduciaries, the only standard set up being that of the "prudent man."
The "prudent man" is defined to be a person of discretion and intelligence who is seeking a reasonable income and the preservation of his capital. The Act likewise provides that the custodian may retain any security
given to the minor in the manner therein prescribed without reinvesting
same. It is provided in detail how a custodian shall hold and register securities, and further that the custodian must keep all custodial property
separate and distinct from his own property; he must keep records of all
transactions and make them available for inspection by a parent or legal
representative of the minor or by the minor himself if he has attained the
age of fourteen years.
To protect the custodian the Act provides that he is entitled to reimbursement from the custodial property for all his reasonable expenses.
A custodian may receive reasonable compensation for his services unless
he is a donor. The amount of his compensation is determined by (1) a
direction by the donor when the gift is made, (2) a statute of Montana
applicable to custodians, (3) the statute of the state applicable to guardians, or (4) by an order of the court. A custodian is not required to give
a bond for the performance of any duties except upon the order of a court.
In order to allow a custodian to freely buy and sell bonds or securities
and other property, all third persons are exempted from any liability in
connection with any dealings they may have with a custodian (in the absence of fraud, of course).
The Act provides in great detail the method of choosing a successor
custodian in the event of the resignation, death or removal of the original
custodian. If the custodian is not the donor, he may resign by executing
an instrument of resignation, designating the successor custodian, and causing all securities to be registered in the name of the successor custodian.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 67-1801.
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A custodian, whether or not the donor, may also resign by petitioning a
court to appoint a successor custodian. Protection is also given in the
event a custodian violates any of his obligations. Either the donor, the
legal representative of a donor, an adult member of the minor's family, a
guardian of the minor, or the minor himself if he has reached the age of
fourteen years may petition the court to remove the custodian for cause
and appoint a successor custodian, or, in the alternative, require that the
custodian give a bond for the performance of his duties.
Any of the persons named above can at any time petition the court for
an accounting by the custodian or his legal representative, and the custodian must then make an accounting to the court.
The Uniform Act is a very convenient way to make a gift to a minor.
It qualifies under section 2503 (c) so that the annual exclusion will be obtained, yet it avoids the red tape and limitations of a guardianship. It also
allows a gift to be made to a minor without the necessity of executing trust
instruments. In Revenue Ruling 56-86," the Internal Revenue Service has
ruled that a gift under the Colorado Act constitutes a completed gift for
federal gift tax purposes at the time of the transfer of securities to the
custodian, and therefore qualifies for the annual exclusion. Considerable
importance was placed on the provision in the Act to the effect that the
gift "shall convey to the minor indefeasibly vested legal title." This emphasis on legal title may be of considerable significance in determining the
income and estate tax consequences of these custodianship gifts, as will be
pointed out below.
Though the foregoing discussion has concerned itself solely with
qualifying a gift to take advantage of the $3,000 exclusion, it should not be
overlooked that the question of whether or not a gift is a future interest is
applicable only to the value of the corpus, or remainder interest. For example, suppose a trust is created to pay the income of B, a minor, for his
life, with the remainder to C. Obviously the gift of the remainder does not
qualify for the annual exclusion. But if it is also clear that the value of
B's income interest will qualify for the annual exclusion since it is a present interest. Therefore, even though a donor does not wish to qualify
under section 2503(c), he may still obtain an exclusion with respect to
the value of the income interest he may give to a minor. Therefore, in
those cases where a donor does not want the donee to obtain the full amount
of the corpus and accumulated income at the age of twenty-one, or does not
want to authorize invasion of the corpus, he can still obtain the annual exclusion to the extent of the value of the income interest that he may give to
the minor. Of course, the value of the income interest will always be less
than the amount of cash or market value of other property given to the
minor, and therefore a gift tax liability would result if the gift does not
'1956--i CuM. Bum 449.
'The Colorado act is not exactly the same as the Uniform Act. Colorado has adopted
an act based upon the "Model Act Concerning Gifts of Securities to Minors." See
note 13 supra. Although there are variations between the two acts with regard to
form and substance, the elements of the Model Act which led to the ruling under
consideration are also present In the Uniform Act. Commissioners' Prefatory Note,
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 9B U.L.A.
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qualify under section 2503(c), assuming that the donor has exhausted
his lifetime exemption as distinguished from the yearly exclusion.
INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES
Since the enactment of section 2503(c) and likewise since the enactment of the Uniform Act, the gift tax consequences of gifts to minors have
become clear if a donor is willing to qualify under the Act. The income
tax consequences, however, are not so clear. As has been pointed out, a
gift qualifying under section 2503(c) must allow a discretion in the trustee or the custodian to apply income for the benefit of the minor donee.
Therefore, as under section 677, ' 8 which is part of the so-called "Clifford
Trust" rules, to the extent any income is actually applied or distributed
for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the donor is legally
obligated to support or maintain, such income will be taxed to the donor.
This tax result is proper, since it has long been held that to the extent the
income is used to satisfy and perform obligations required of the donor,
such use is substantially the same as though the income was paid directly
to the donor.
The Internal Revenue Service, however, raised a rather serious question when it promulgated Revenue Ruling 56-484."' This ruling discusses
the income tax consequences of the Colorado Model Custodian Act,' and
concludes:
Regardless of the relationship of the donor or of the custodian
to the donee, income derived from property transferred under the
model custodian act adopted by the State of Colorado and a
number of other states which is used in the discharge or satisfaction, in whole or in part, of a legal obligation of any person to support or maintain a minor is, to the extent so used, taxable to such
person under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
However, the amount of such income includible in the gross income of a person obligated to support or maintain a minor is limited by the extent of his legal obligations under local law. To the
extent that income derived from the property in question is not
so includible in the gross income of the person obligated to support or maintain the minor (donee), such income is taxable to the
minor.
This revenue ruling shows that there should be no danger that the
donor or some other person will be treated as the substantial owner of the

1954, § 677(b) : "Income of a trust shall not be considered taxable to the grantor ...merely because such income in the discretion of another person, the trustee, or the grantor acting as trustee or co-trustee, may be applied or
distributed for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is
legally obligated to support or maintain, except to the extent that such income is
so applied or distributed."
'*1956-2 CuM. BuL- 23.
*As pointed out In footnote 18, supra, although the Colorado act Is not identical to
the Uniform Act, as far as federal tax consequences are concerned they may be
considered the same.
TINT. REV. CODE OF
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personal properties under sections 671-678' of the 1954 Code, and hence
taxed on the income because he had dominion over them. In addition, it
should be noted that the Commissioner has read into section 61(a)' the
limitation found in section 677(b) and 678(c), wherein only to the extent that trust income is actually used to discharge a legal obligation of
support is it taxable to someone other than the trust beneficiary. However, the main problem created by this Revenue Ruling is that it holds that
income of the custodianship used to discharge someone's obligation of support is taxable to the person having the obligation, whether he be the donor,
custodian or some innocent parent who had nothing whatever to do with
the gift. For example, if A grandparent transfers to himself a large quantity of securities as custodian for B's minor children and uses the income
therefrom to support such children, then under Revenue Ruling 56-484,
B will be taxed on the income so used for support of the children. Such a
position is contrary to the case of Frank E. Joseph,' where income from a
trust used to support a minor son was taxable to his father only to the extent of the portion of the trust fund attributed to the father, excluding
that portion contributed by the minor's grandfather. The ruling also
seems contrary to Revenue Ruling 55-469," wherein dividends on stock
given by grandparents to their grandchildren but registered in the names
of the parents as nominees were taxable to the minors and not to the parents, although the Revenue Service, to distinguish the two rulings, has
stated that in Revenue Ruling 55-469 it was assumed that none of the income under local law could have been used for the support and maintenance of the minors. There is some support, however, in dictum contained
in Stix v. Commissioner.' In any event, the ruling of the Commissioner
with respect to this matter seems unduly harsh if the donor is a person
who has no legal obligation to support the minor beneficiary. It does not
seem proper that to the extent such money is used to support the minor,
the minor's parents should be taxed on such income since the complete
transaction was out of their hands.
If an outright gift is made to a minor, in the usual situation there is
no income tax consequence to the donor. For example, if a donor gives
outright to a minor certain moneys or other personal property, the donor
does not pay any tax on the future income that may be earned from such
property, and such income is taxed to the minor. However, there is an
area in the law, not yet fully explored, in which the donor will incur income tax upon property which is the subject of an outright gift to a minor.
The leading case in this area is that of Helvering v. Horst, where the
owner of negotiable bonds detached interest coupons from them shortly before their due date and delivered the coupons as a gift to his son, who then
REv. CODE OF 1954. The provisions referred to are those enacted for the purpose of preventing avoidance of a tax on income from property where the grantor
in substance derives the benefit while concealing this fact through the use of a trust
device.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) : "Except as otherwise provided ... gross income
means all income from whatever source derived ......
-5 T.C. 1049 (1945).
"1955-2 CuM. BuLL. 519.
"152 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1945).
"311 U.S. 112 (1940).
"INT.
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obtained their payment. The United States Supreme Court held that the
amount of the interest was includable in the gross income of the father,
still the owner of the bonds. The reasoning of the Horst case was that the
donor lad the power to dispose of the income from the bonds, and the exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is the enjoyment and hence the realization of income. In fact, in that case the donor
taxpayer was on a cash basis, but this was immaterial according to the
Court, since he in effect realized the income himself when he gave it to
his son.
The Horst doctrine was followed by the Internal Revenue Service in
I. T. 3932,' involving a gift situation that is pertinent in this area. A
father, a livestock raiser, made a gift to his son of some feeder cattle. At
the time of the gift the cattle were worth $1,500, and the father had deducted his cost of feeding and raising the cattle on prior tax returns. The
ruling held that the fair market value of the cattle on the date of the gift
was includible in the father's gross income for the taxable year of the gift.
That value in turn became the son's basis for the cattle. The reasoning of
the ruling was based on the Horst case; i.e., a gift of income which in effect
was realized by the father when he made the gift to his son. In Campbell
v. Prothro,' the Fifth Circuit rejected I. T. 3932 in the case of a gift of
calves to the YMCA, a qualified charitable organization. The court there
held that there was no income realized by the donor when he made the gift
to charity, even though the calves were clearly inventory-type property.
Likewise, in Estate of Farrierv. Commissioner,' involving a gift of cattle
by a mother to her daughter, the Tax Court refused to apply the Horst
doctrine and I. T. 3932, and held that there was no income to the mother
at the time of the gift. The same result was reached in Sorelle v. Commissio-ner," which involved a gift of land with a matured wheat crop having a value of over $50,000 about one week prior to harvesting. The effect
of these decisions is to permit a cash basis taxpayer to deduct the expenses
of raising cattle or crops and also to either obtain a charitable deduction
for the full amount of the gift or to shift the income to a donee such as a
child of the donor.
After the last three cases were decided against the Commissioner, the
Internal Revenue Service promulgated Revenue Ruling 55-138.' This
Revenue Ruling concerned the problem of a gift to a charitable institution
of inventory-type assets such as cattle or unharvested wheat. The effect
of this Ruling is that the Commissioner no longer will claim that the gift
when made constitutes income to the donor, but the Commissioner's position now is that all expenses that have been paid or incurred by the donor
in connection with the property given away will be disallowed as a deduc'tion to the donor. Since Revenue Ruling 55-138 does not mention the
situation involved when a donor makes a gift to an individual rather than
a charitable institution, presumably I. T. 3932 is still in effect. However,
it is hard to see how the principle differs in the two situations.
171948-2 Cum. BuLL. 7.
'209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954).
-15 T.C. 277 (1950).
-22 T.C. 459 (1954).
'1955--1 CuM. BULL. 223.
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The position of the Commissioner in apparently abandoning the Horst
doctrine in this area because of some adverse decisions in the courts, and
instead of disallowing as deductions the expenses of raising the particular
property given away, seems to this writer to be incorrect in theory. The
Horst doctrine certainly gives the Commissioner a substantial right to
claim that income resulted to the donor when inventory-type property is
made the subject of a gift. There is, however, little, if any, authority for
the Commissioner to disallow valid and proper business expenses paid or
incurred in the raising of the property involved. This writer believes
that the Commissioner should rather insist on the application of the Horst
doctrine in this situation until finally adjudicated by the United States Supreme Court rather than to disallow various expenses for which there is
little authority for the Commissioner to rely on.
ESTATE TAX CONSEQUENCES
Finally, a word must be said regarding the estate tax consequences of
gifts to minors. The Commissioner has not yet issued a ruling on the estate
tax consequences of transfers under the Uniform Act and there may be
some serious questions involved. It would seem logical that if a valid and
completed gift has been made under the Uniform Act, there should not be
any portion of such property included in the donor's estate upon his death,
except for a possible gift made in contemplation of death within three
years of the donor's decease.' However, if the donor is the custodian of
the property, section 2038(a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code might well
include in the gross estate of the donor all of the property unexpended at
the date of death of the decedent. Section 2038(a) (1) includes in the
gross estate a transfer by a decedent where its enjoyment is subject to a
power in him to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate. Since the custodian
under the Uniform Act has the power to invade the corpus and in effect to
terminate the custodianship, the securities may well be included in the
donor's estate if he should die before the minor reaches twenty-one. In
Lober v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held that such
a power to invade is equivalent to a power to alter, amend or revoke.
Therefore, until the Commissioner rules on the estate tax consequences of
the Uniform Act, it might well be prudent for the donor to select a custodian other than himself if he wishes to be certain that the property will
not be included in his estate should he die before the minor reaches the age
of twenty-one.
In conclusion, the enactment of the Montana Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act is a forward step to encourage legitimate tax reduction and to minimize the cumbersome and unsatisfactory results attendant upon the use of
a guardianship for minors. It should be taken advantage of whenever circumstances permit, and lawyers and accountants should educate their
clients to the advantages possible.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035: "(a) The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property . . . of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer

MINT.

(except in case of a bona fide sale . .

.)

.

.

. in contemplation of death."

Subsec-

tion (b) provides In effect that there is a rebuttable presumption that transfers
within three years of death are in contemplation of death and, also, that there is a
conclusive presumption that transfers before this time are not in contemplation of
death.
46 U.S. 335 (1953).
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